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At the beginning of the Uruguay Round,  governments agreed  to  bring all measures affecting 
import access and export competition in agriculture under stronger GAIT rules and disciplines. 
They  further agreed  that internal farm  policies,  and  not  simply  border measures,  should  be 
addressed  in  the negotiations.  This  commitment was  strengthened  at the Round's mid-term 
review,  when  governments  agreed  to  negotiate  "substantial  and  progressive  reductions  in 
agricultural support and protection" in order to establish a "fair and market-oriented agricultural 
trading system."  In the final months of the negotiations a framework emerged, which identified 
three main areas for action: internal support,  import access and export competition. 
The United States and the Cairns Group have proposed specific commitments in each of 
these areas.  The European Community, however, has proposed the reduction of  internal support 
levels,  but without specific commitments in all areas.  The EC proposal was  unacceptable to 
most  of the  nations  at  the  Brussels  talks  in  early  December.  They  felt  that  the  EC's 
unwillingness to accept specific commitments did not satisfy the agreements reached earlier in 
the negotiations.  In their view, the level of reductions in internal support was negotiable, but 
that specific commitments in the three areas were essential for the talks to continue.  Late in the 
meeting, a suggested compromise package (known as the Hellstrom proposal) was put forth in 
an attempt to provide a basis  for continued negotiation.  It received limited support from  the 
United  States  and  the  Cairns  Group.  But the  EC  was  unwilling  to  accept it as  a basis  for 
negotiations.  And  so  the Brussels  meeting  ended  without an  agreement and with  the United 
States and  the  Cairns  Group pledging  not  to  return  until the EC  was  willing  to table a new 
proposal. 
Efforts are  underway  to  revive  the  negotiations.  At  this juncture,  it is  important to 
remember  that  the  costs  of failure  of the  negotiation  are  high,  but  that  for  an  agricultural 
package to be meaningful, it must contain certain essential elements.  The Hellstrom proposal 
provides useful starting point to determine the flexibility needed to revive the negotiations, and 
to result in be a meaningful agreement for agricultural trade. 
Costs of Failure.  Failure in the negotiations will lead to a deterioration of  international 
economic relations.  Failure will likely lead to a resurgence of  unilateral action to settle trade 
disputes.  This unilateralism posses particular problems for developing nations and  the  "new 
market economies" of Eastern Europe.  Failure will give a push to regional solutions to trade 
problems.  Participants in regional trade pacts are likely to discriminate against those outside the 
region, and so lead to a breakdown of the multilateral trading system.  Developing nations and 
new market economies would be hardest hit by a breakdown of  the trading system into regional 
trading  blocks.  Failure  in  the  negotiations  will  complicate  the  process  of meeting  the 
unprecedented challenges of restructuring Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, of  resolving the 
crisis in the Middle East and of expanding integration of the rapidly growing trade in goods, 
services, entrepreneurship and technology.  Continued skirmishes in agricultural trade will make 
agreement in the other areas more diffiCUlt to  reach.  It is a distraction this is unneeded,  and, 
moreover, it is avoidable. Failure in the negotiations could lead to an intensified agricultural trade war.  Nations 
can place large costs on themselves and other nations by intensifying the agricultural trade war, 
but will gain little in international market share.  As there is little room for the United States 
to retaliate if it acts only on EC agricultural imports, the trade war could escalate to include 
non-agricultural trade at great cost to all involved.  And even if a trade war does not take place, 
the developed countries will continue to place unneeded costs on their treasuries and consumers 
and developing countries will continue to be seriously harmed. 
Failure  in  the  negotiations  will frustrate  needed domestic policy  reform.  All nations 
recognize the need to reform policies but are limited by the actions of other nations.  This is the 
significance of collective action through a GAIT agreement. 
Critical Elements of an Agreement.  To make a contribution to easing problems of 
world agricultural trade, an agreement must have the following critical elements. 
On internal support: 
./  Governments should agree on a list of acceptable domestic measures . 
./  There should be an agreement  to  place a ceiling on current levels of trade-distorting 
internal support, preferably by commodity sector, as measured by an agreed aggregate 
measure of support.  These levels would then be subject to a reduction comparable with 
that agreed for border measures and export subsidies . 
./  A  mechanism  should  be  established  within  the  GAIT  to  monitor  national  policy 
adjustments, to provide for an ongoing process of verification and review, and to settle 
disputes about the commitments. 
On market access: 
./  Countries should agree on the objective of tariffication of all non-tariff import barriers, 
and a start should be made on this process subject to safeguards . 
./  Market access  should be increased by reducing  new and existing tariffs by an  agreed 
percentage over a specified period of years.  Minimum access commitments, expanding 
over time  would  insure  that agreed  reductions  in  import barriers  have  the  intended 
effects.  Such agreements  could  be substituted  for  agreed  trade barrier reductions in 
particular agreed situations  . 
./  The degree of market orientation in domestic prices should be seen to increase over time . 
./  There should be no increases in trade barriers as part of the agreement. 
On export competition:  . 
./  Countries should commit to reduce their use of export subsidies . 
./  Export subsidies should be limited in their operation to those commodities currently being 
subsidized.  Current levels of export subsidies should be frozen and then reduced over 
time at a rate at least comparable to that for import barriers and internal supports . 
./  Export subsidies per unit should be limited to  the level of import tariffs for the same 
commodity. 
ii Toward  A Meaningful  Agricultural  Agreement.  It is  generally  agreed  that  the 
European Community must  make the  next move.  The United States and  the Cairns Group, 
though certainly not completely happy with the Hellstrom proposal, have indicated that it could 
be the basis for continued negotiations.  The EC, on the other hand, has had great difficulty in 
moving  away  from  its  original  position.  Hence,  a  good  starting  point  is  to  look  at  the 
differences between the Hellstrom paper and the original EC offer and to consider how they can 
be bridged. 
Internal Support.  A possible compromise would be to stick to a 30 percent reduction by 
1995, but to set the base period to 1988 if some negotiating credit must be given for adjustments 
made  to  domestic  farm  programs.  As  a quid pro  quo,  the  EC  could  then  agree to  a  firm 
commitment to  review  the agreement in  1994  or 1995,  with  the objective of continuing the 
process of farm policy reform through the end of the century. 
Market Access.  The obligation to tariffy non-tariff barriers must be confirmed explicitly 
in the final agreement.  The EC could tum back to the original Commission proposal to reduce 
the fixed tariffs that would replace its current variable levies by 30 percent, to start from a more 
recent base period, and  should  treat fluctuations in exchange rates  and  in  world commodity 
market prices equally in any modifications meant to buffer against large world price changes. 
Finally, tariff equivalents should be calculated from  the prices EC producers actually receive 
rather than from official support prices. 
Hellstrom proposed a 5 percent  minimum access  commitment as  had Canada and  the 
Cairns  Group.  Expanded quantitative access  and  the willingness to phase-out exports of the 
commodities concerned would be possible beginning for Canada and others appealing to their 
use of supply control as  their contribution to reducing trade distortions. 
Among the more troublesome aspects of the negotiations on market access has been the 
EC's demand to  "rebalance" protection as a condition for its agreement to tariffication of the 
variable levy.  If the Community insists  on revoking  zero tariff bindings it should do  so  by 
invoking  Article  XXVIII  of the  General  Agreement  and  negotiate  an  appropriate  level  of 
compensation  to  its  trading  partners.  If,  however,  rebalancing  of protection  is  a  political 
imperative  for  the  EC  than  the  negotiations  should  seize  on  the  EC's indication  that  it  is 
prepared to limit rebalancing to non-grain feeds.  This would avoid the increase in protection 
on oilseeds and their products.  The present level of market access of the other products could 
be safeguarded with tariff quotas. 
Export  Competition.  The opposition of the  EC  to  any  specific  constraint on  export 
subsidies has been the most difficult problem facing  the negotiators until now.  However,  the 
EC has indicated that it might be prepared to  limit the quantities of subsidized exports it puts 
on  the  world  market.  The Hellstrom  proposal  suggests  a  reduction  of subsidized  export 
quantities by 30 percent over five years.  Entering  into  commitments  on  export  assistance 
expenditures should be preferred.  A significant reduction of such outlays over a five-year period 
iii from  1990  levels  would  be a  sensible  complement to  reducing  internal  support  and  access 
barriers over the same period. 
Conclusion.  The Brussels talks injected a sense of realism and urgency into the Uruguay 
Round  that had  been  lacking  in  the preceding  months.  The EC  can now  see  that the  other 
nations were serious when they said that without a meaningful agreement in agriculture there 
could be no agreement in other areas.  The United States and the Cairns Group countries, on 
the other hand, now better appreciate the political difficulties that the Ee faces in reforming its 
agricultural  policies.  The  crisis  may  have  created  a  better  understanding  of each  others' 
positions and of possible compromise. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In  early  December,  the  108  countries  participating  in  the  Uruguay  Round  of GAIT trade 
negotiations, convened in Brussels to  draw the talks to a successful conclusion.  On  the table 
were workable draft agreements for further liberalizing trade in manufactures, for regulating the 
rapidly  growing  trade  in  services,  for  protection  of intellectual  property  rights,  and  for 
strengthening GAIT's dispute settlement mechanisms.  The enactment of  these agreements have 
been put in jeopardy by the failure to reach a compromise on rules and disciplines to govern 
agricultural trade.  The United  States and  the  members  of the Cairns  Group of agricultural 
exporters  refused  to  accept  a  weak  agreement  on  agriculture,  even  if it  would  facilitate 
agreements in the other areas of the negotiations.  The European Community, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea,  on  the other hand,  were  not  willing  to  contribute to  a  more  substantial 
commitment in agriculture even to  save the Round. 
At the beginning of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, governments agreed to 
bring all measures affecting import access and export competition for agricultural products under 
stronger GAIT rules and disciplines.  They further agreed that internal farm policies, and not 
just  border  measures,  should  be  addressed  in  the  negotiations.  This  commitment  was 
strengthened  by  the  April  1989  Mid-Term  Review  agreement  to  negotiate  "substantial  and 
progressive reductions"  in agricultural support and protection in order to establish a "fair and 
market-oriented agricultural trading system." 
This agreement on aims of the negotiations, however,  masked an underlying difference 
on the extent and nature of commitments to such policy reform.  This shows up in particular in 
the degree to which domestic policies would be subject to international disciplines and the extent 
to  which trade in  agriculture should be governed by the GAIT's normal rules.  The United 
States and Cairns Group's proposals would have gone far toward integrating agriculture fully 
into the international trading  system.  The EC and Japan,  by contrast,  sought to preserve the 
essentials of  their current agricultural policies (and the trade arrangements that accompany these) 
while reducing their trade distorting effects somewhat both by international agreement and by 
continuation of their internal efforts to adjust domestic farm policy.  Canada proposed reforms 
that  would  benefit its agricultural export sectors  but  sought  to  retain  the  quantitative import 
controls that underpin its supply management programs for dairy and poUltry products. 
The negotiations proceeded  based  on  a framework  proposed  by  the Chairman of the 
Agricultural Negotiating Group.  This identified three areas for action: 
•  internal support; 
•  import access;  and 
•  export competition. 
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It also proposed negotiations on reduction targets,  sanitary regulations, rules and surveillance. 
The expectation was that nations would offer significant commitments in each of these areas to 
attain "substantial and progressive"  reductions in support and protection. 
The United States and the Cairns Group did propose specific commitments in each area 
including the binding and reduction of tariffs (as well as new tariffs adopted to replace non-tariff 
barriers), significant reductions in trade-distorting internal support and a more rapid reduction 
in export subsidies.  The U. S. proposal extends domestic policy changes already enacted in the 
1990 Agriculture, Food, Conservation and Trade Act and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act and would commit others to  similar actions.  Canada stressed  the dismantling of export 
subsidy programs and the modification of GATT articles in order to maintain import controls 
for supply control programs.  Because of its insistence on retaining import quotas in agricultural 
trade, Canada's commitment to substantial and progressive reduction in support and protection 
is correspondingly less than that of the United States and of the other members of the Cairns 
Group. 
The proposal of the European Community placed emphasis on the reduction of overall 
support levels, rather than on action in the three areas of support and protection.  The reduction 
in  support  levels  suggested  by  the  Community  would  provide an  underpinning  of domestic 
reforms,  in  particular through  the lowering of support prices.  Though less convinced of the 
need to change policy instruments, the EC has proposed its own version of tariffication to take 
the place of its variable levies.  This would include price-triggered safeguards to dampen the 
extent to which world price and exchange rate changes would be translated into import price 
changes.  Internal EC policy reforms would be facilitated by limiting market access  for non-
cereal feeds and oilseeds.  Accordingly,  the EC's offer to reduce overall internal support and 
tariffy its levies is conditional on the "rebalancing" of protection on these products.  This would 
imply increasing tariffs currently bound at zero or very low levels. 
The  EC  proposal  was  unacceptable  to  most  other  nations,  who  reasoned  that  the 
unwillingness to accept specific policy commitments on market access and export subsidies did 
not satisfy the commitments laid down in the April 1989 agreement.  In their view, the level of 
cuts  was  negotiable,  but commitments  must  be made  in  all  elements of the already  agreed 
framework of the negotiations.  The EC, by contrast, could not offer the type of assurances on 
export subsidies that were regarded as essential by other countries.  An attempt by the Swedish 
Agriculture Minister,  Mats Hellstrom,  to  forge a compromise at the Brussels  meeting  found 
some support, but the EC was unable to accept it as a basis for negotiations.  The session failed 
when  many  nations judged  that  no  further  progress  was  likely  to  be  made  at the Brussels 
meeting. 
Efforts are underway to revive the negotiations.  The United States and the Cairns Group, 
however, have pledged not to return to the negotiating table unless the EC modifies its position. 
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At this juncture, it is important to remember that the costs of failure of the negotiation are high, 
but that for an agricultural package to be meaningful, it must contain certain essential elements. 
The  Hellstrom proposal  provides  useful  starting  point to  determine  the  flexibility  needed  to 
revive the negotiations, and to result in be a meaningful agreement for agricultural trade. 
ll.  COSTS OF FAILURE 
Economic growth in the world has been well-served by the emergence of a multilateral trading 
system based on agreed rules, and by a steady reduction in trade barriers in manufactured goods. 
At a time when recessionary economic conditions are generating protectionist tendencies, and 
when  many  developing  countries  and  most of the erstwhile centrally-planned economies are 
reforming  their domestic  economic policies,  preservation  of an  open,  stable and  transparent 
world marketplace is more essential than ever.  The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was 
designed  to  strengthen  the  liberal  economic  order  by  further  opening  markets  and  by 
incorporating  into  the  GATT  several  areas  of trade  that  had  escaped  effective international 
discipline, such as services, agriculture and textiles, and by addressing the trade tensions arising 
from different national rules for foreign investment and intellectual property rights.  Along with 
this, the GATT's dispute settlement mechanisms were to be enhanced.  It is this process that is 
threatened by a breakdown in the GATT negotiations. 
Deterioration of International Economic Relations 
In addition to the construction of desirable trade rules, periodic GATT negotiations also serve 
to  counter the natural tendency for governments to  yield to  special interest pressure at home. 
Such protectionist forces can only gain strength from a failure of the Uruguay Round.  In the 
1930s, by enacting high tariffs to protect domestic industries, the United States and other nations 
dramatically  reduced  trade and  exacerbated  the  economic  collapse of the  Great Depression. 
Some commentators have pointed to a similar outcome if the current negotiations fail.  Begger-
thy-neighbor tariff warfare of the type seen in the 1930s seems unlikely today.  More probable 
is the prospect that countries will use the  "remedy" provisions of their trade laws to  exclude 
imports with anti-dumping and countervailing duties or to provide subsidies to  their domestic 
industries.  There will nevertheless be significant costs to the global economy of a failure in the 
GATT negotiations. 
One such cost is likely to be a resurgence of unilateral action to  "solve" trade disputes. 
Many in the United States will argue for the EC to be targeted for unfair trade practices, with 
the prospect of retaliatory import tariffs.  The EC itself will find it more convenient to shelter 
behind its own trade barriers and  keep at home the benefits of the expanded internal market. 
Unilateralism poses particular problems for the smaller developed countries and the developing 
countries, whose lack of large internal market makes it difficult either to grow without trade or 
to  participate in  a trading  system  based  on  power rather than  multilateral rules.  The "new 
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:, 
market economies" also will find increasing difficulty in reorienting their domestic production 
to world markets if market access is at the whim of the major trading nations. 
Failure in the Uruguay Round will also give a push toward regional solutions to trade 
problems.  Such regional trade arrangements can have a constructive place in a multilateral trade 
system,  and  can  be consistent with the letter of the GATT.  But in  the absence of a strong 
multilateral framework, participants in bilateral and regional trade pacts are likely to succumb 
to the temptation to discriminate against those outside their region.  The trading system could 
in essence break into competing trade blocs, with serious implications for living standards.  Once 
again, the developing and new market economies would be hardest hit by such a development. 
The challenges facing the international community are unprecedented.  The restructuring 
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will place enormous demands on economic and political 
resources.  The crisis in the Middle East demands international cooperation and united efforts 
to find a lasting solution.  The expanding integration of markets for goods, services, technology 
and entrepreneurship requires an  accepted  set of international rules to prevent an increase in 
protectionism  and  reduced  economic  growth.  If the  international  atmosphere  is  negatively 
charged by continued skirmishes in international agricultural trade,  agreement in these other 
areas will be more difficult to reach.  It is a distraction that is unneeded,  and,  moreover, it is 
avoidable. 
Agricultural Trade Warfare 
In addition to the unfortunate impacts on trade relations in general, failure to reach an agreement 
in agriculture could have a substantial negative effect on agricultural markets.  The two most 
likely outcomes are the expansion of the ongoing contest among the major exporters to maintain 
market  shares,  and  disruption  of the process  of putting  domestic  farm  policies  on  a  stable 
economic footing.  Loss  in  the  momentum  toward  trade and domestic  policy reform would 
represent a serious  setback for  world  agriculture.  Besides  perpetuating costly subsidies and 
denying markets to efficient producers, this also would distort the emerging market economies 
who would have to face  the choice of competitive subsidization of agriculture or of accepting 
the sale of domestic supplies at depressed prices on world markets. 
The subsidized production and exports of the developed  nations depress  international 
prices  for  agricultural  commodities.  The  total  outlays  from  taxpayers  and  consumers  on 
agricultural subsidies in the major developed countries has been estimated at about $250 billion 
per year.  Some $60 billion of the expenditures on subsidies and the cost to consumers merely 
offsets the subsidy policies of other nations.  In the neighborhood of $15 billion of that amount 
is' transferred to U. S.  farmers  to offset the support provided to  farmers  in the EC and other 
developed nations, while about $12 billion is transferred to EC farmers to offset support in the 
United States and other developed nations. 
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This situation will only worsen with an intensified trade war between the United States 
and the EC.  The negative effects on world markets and the cost of policies would be increased 
further as other nations respond to domestic political pressures to  step up their subsidy levels. 
Canada, Australia and other developed-country exporters will face pressure to provide increased 
domestic and export subsidies.  And so the costs placed on all countries' taxpayers, consumers 
and economies will increase, with little benefit for their agricultural producers. 
But, even with increased subsidization of agricultural exports, the ability of the United 
States to  change policies in the EC is very limited.  The impact of the Export Enhancement 
Program (EEP) has not been enough to drive the EC to reform the CAP.  Indeed, much of the 
cost of EEP has been borne by Canada, Australia and other agricultural exporters in the Cairns 
Group and some developing country exporters. 
As attempts to penalize the EC  through increased agricultural export subsidies achieve 
predictably limited results, pressures will mount to place tariffs on U.S. imports from the EC. 
This could have some significant sectoral impacts, such as effectively closing the U.S. market 
to Danish pork imports, which would likely force the EC to intervene massively in that market 
for the first time.  Ironically, many of the retaliatory options open to the United States would 
adversely impact the efficient agricultural producers, and  the proponents of freer trade in the 
EC, such as Denmark and the Netherlands.  Nevertheless, restrictions on EC agricultural exports 
to the United States are unlikely to force the desired changes in the CAP.  The EC has  more 
opportunities for such  retaliatory actions:  the member countries import about $6.6 billion of 
agricultural products from the United States compared with about $4.2 billion of agricultural 
exports to the United States.  So a trade war would be bound to spill over into trade in industrial 
goods and services.  In the neighborhood of $75 billion flows each way in these products so the 
latitude for retaliatory actions is large indeed. 
Two  conclusions emerge.  First,  nations can place large  budgetary,  consumer and 
economic welfare costs on themselves and other nations by participating in an agricultural 
trade war,  but will gain little in international market share.  Second, as there is little room for 
the United States to retaliate if  it acts only on EC agricultural imports,  the trade war could 
escalate to include non-agricultural trade at great cost to all involved.  And even if  a trade war 
does not take place,  the developed countries will continue to place unneeded costs on their 
treasuries and consumers and developing countries will continue to be seriously hanned. 
Frustration of Needed Domestic Policy Refonn 
The  United  States,  EC,  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  many  other  nations  have 
undertaken  needed  farm  policy  reforms.  Logically,  governments  and  farm  groups in those 
nations link the reform of their domestic policies to reduce agricultural subsidization and trade 
liberalization in other nations.  It may be much  more difficult to sustain this process of reform 
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without the collective will of countries acting together to undertake mutual disarmament in their 
contending farm subsidy and trade policies. 
In some cases,  recent policy changes have included an explicit link to the trade talks. 
For instance, in the United States, the recently enacted 1990 Agriculture, Food, Conservation 
and Trade Act and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act aims to move the U.S. policies well 
down  the  road  toward  less  trade-distorting  policies  while  meeting  domestic  objectives  by 
production-neutral means.  Lack of an agreement could trigger a sharp expansion of U. S. export 
subsidy programs,  lead  to  a  reversal  of the  spending  cuts  mandated in  the budget package, 
require a marketing loan program for wheat and feed  grains and  suspend  the area reduction 
provisions in grain programs. 
Farm groups in other nations will follow a similar course if the negotiations fail, leading 
to a further deterioration of the international trading environment. And so  a circle of  vicious 
counteractions is formed: all nations recognize the need to reform policies but are limited by 
the actions of other nations.  This is the significance of collective action through a GAIT 
agreement. 
III.  CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT 
While the first priority is to revive the GATT negotiations as a whole, the objective should still 
be to achieve a useful and credible package of agricultural trade reforms.  Expectations can be 
adjusted to account for political constraints but should still focus on meaningful improvements 
in the way in which the agricultural trade" system operates.  To make a constructive contribution 
to easing the problems of world agricultural trade, an agreement must have at least the following 
three key components: 
•  The  agreement must begin the process of  moving agriculture toward the normal 
disciplines of the GAIT.  It may  be that a period of specific  rules is needed  to 
accomplish this, but countries should avoid the temptation to write a separate code 
for agriculture which exempts that sector from the general rules of the GATT, i.e., 
tariff-only,  transparent  border  protection;  trade  without  the  distortion  of export 
subsidies; and strict disciplines on domestic subsidies to prevent their being used as 
back door trade protection.  Current waivers and exceptions to GATT rules should 
be removed, and the rules should apply equally to all countries. 
•  The agreement must support and encourage the ongoing process of  domestic policy 
reform.  Countries have made some progress in changing their farm income support 
policies away from open-ended price guarantees toward more targeted, limited and 
less market-distorting forms of assistance.  This change has occurred in developing 
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as well as developed countries.  A trade agreement should contribute an incentive to 
continue this  trend and a penalty for  backsliding.  For this  reason,  the agreement 
should include explicit GAIT rules and bindings to discipline particular elements 
of  domestic support programs that distort trade. 
•  To  facilitate  these  reforms  and  to  achieve balance and  credibility,  an  agreement 
should contain commitments on each of the three elements of internal support, 
market access and export competition.  These elements were identified in the Mid-
Term review and subsequently agreed by the majority of countries as constituting the 
framework  for  negotiations.  Though  these  commitments are closely  linked,  and 
indeed one policy  change can  satisfy  more  than  one requirement,  a coherent and 
verifiable reform package must be expressed in terms of each of these three areas. 
The critical elements that would fall under each of these headings are listed below. 
Internal Support 
,/  Governments should agree on a "green light" list of  acceptable domestic measures, 
which are allowed on grounds that they are minimally trade-distorting. Such policies 
could be agreed to be not countervailable: the remaining "non-green" policies would 
then continue to be countervailable under the Subsidies Code. 
,/  There should be an agreement to place a ceiling on current levels of  trade -distorting 
internal  support,  preferably  by  commodity  sector,  as  measured  by  an  agreed 
aggregate measure of  support.  These levels would then be subject to a reduction 
comparable  with  that agreed for border  measures  and export  subsidies.  The 
reductions must be effective in reducing the trade-distorting effect of  domestic support 
policies from  the start of the period of the agreement. The agreement should cover 
support given by  sub-national levels of government (and national levels in the case 
of the  EC)  where  such  support  would  be  considered  distorting  if offered  at  the 
national (or EC) level. 
,/  A mechanism should be established within the GAIT to maintain surveillance of 
national policy adjustments,  to provide for an ongoing process of  verification and 
review,  and to settle disputes about the commitments.  This mechanism also should 
be used to exchange information about the operation of less-trade-distorting policies, 
and  to  coordinate,  where  appropriate,  their  introduction  to  replace  "non-green" 
programs and instruments. 
7 Market Access 
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./  Countries  should agree  on  the objective of tarif/ication of all non-tariff imporl 
barriers,  and a starl should be made on this process subject to safeguards to the 
importer against import surges and sharp price drops and to the exporter against loss 
of access in the process of policy reinstrumentation . 
./  Market  access  should· be  increased  by  reducing  new  and existing tariffs by  an 
agreed percentage over a specified period of  years, based on a negotiated reference 
period.  Minimum access  commitments,  expanding over time,  would ensure that 
agreed reductions in imp0rl barriers have the intended effect.  Such agreements 
could be  substituted for trade  barrier reductions in parlicular agreed situations. 
Countries would not have to  commit both to quantitative access targets and phased 
reduction in border instruments.  However, countries would have to provide effective 
market access and demonstrate when requested that the reduction of import barriers 
under the agreement could be expected to increase access to the market in question 
(e.g., where state trading is involved) . 
./  The degree of  market orientation in domestic prices should be seen to increase over 
time.  This could be done by reducing the buffering effect of any agreed safeguards 
against  world  market  price  movements  over a  transition  period.  Exchange  rate 
movements should be considered a normal aspect of  international trade and should not 
trigger separate and additional safeguard-type protection . 
./  There  should be  no increases  in trade  barriers as parl of  the agreement,  though 
normal  GAIT  mechanisms  could  still  be  used  by  countries  wishing  to  unbind 
previous commitments. 
Export Competition 
./  Countries  should commit to  reduce  their use of exporl subsidies.  The ultimate 
objective should be to eliminate such subsidies altogether (as is already the case for 
trade in manufactures).  However, it should be recognized that a phase-out of exports 
subsidies will be more difficult for some countries than others  . 
./  ExpOrl subsidies should be limited in their operation to those commodities currently 
being subsidized.  Current levels of exporl subsidies  should be frozen  and then 
reduced over time at a rate  at least  comparable to  that for imporl barriers  and 
internal supporls.  This could be implemented by an agreement on quantities eligible 
for subsidy,  amount of per unit subsidy,  or total expenditure on such  subsidies or 
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some combination of these.  The exact modality is of less significance than the fact 
that such subsidies would be progressively reduced by international agreement. 
./  Export subsidies per unit should be limited to the level of  import tariffs for the same 
commodity.  This would discourage excessive subsidization, ensure and could exceed 
that such subsidies fell in line with import barriers. 
Most of these elements are on the negotiating table in some form or other.  Discussion 
of the  technical  feasibility  of such  actions  has  been  going  on  for  at least  two  years.  The 
ingredient lacking is the willingness to compromise long-held positions so as to allow a package 
to be put together.  The possible shape of such a compromise is outlined below. 
IV.  TOWARD A :MEANINGFUL AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT 
There is not much point in arguing about who was at fault in the failure at Brussels.  All parties 
will  have  to  show  flexibility if a  meaningful  agreement  is  to  be reached.  Some movement 
forward  was  made  in  Brussels.  However,  much  more  will  have  to  be done  to  bridge the 
remaining  gap.  One possible direction  has  been  indicated  by  the chairman of the  Brussels 
agricultural negotiations, Sweden's Minister of Agriculture Mats Hellstrom, in the "non-paper" 
he tabled on the last full day of the meeting. 
It is generally agreed  that the European  Community  must make the next move.  The 
United States and the Cairns Group, though certainly not completely happy with the Hellstrom 
proposal, have indicated that the paper can be the basis for continued negotiations.  The EC, on 
the other hand,  has  had great difficulty in  moving away from  its original position.  Hence,  a 
good starting point is to look at the differences between the Hellstrom paper and the original EC 
offer and to consider how they can be bridged. 
Internal Support 
Agreement on the reduction of internal support is within reach of the negotiators.  The main 
issues  outstanding  have  to  do  with  the  base  period  used  and  the  extent  of the  reduction. 
Hellstrom adopted the EC figure of a 30 percent reduction by 1995, but shifted the base to 1990. 
Under this  proposal  the  EC,  whose  offer used  1986 as  a  starting  point,  would  not  receive 
"credit"  for the support reductions  made in  the last four  years.  According to  the EC's own 
calculations, this credit amounted to around one-third of the reduction that the EC offered, so 
it would have had to reduce internal support by only 20 percent between 1991  and 1995.  The 
Hellstrom proposal would require the EC to increase the extent of support reductions by roughly 
one-half.  It  would, in this way, bring the level of "allowed" internal support pretty close to that 
implied in the U.S. proposal for  1995  though it would not require a continuation of internal 
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support reductions beyond 1995 as requested by the United States and the Cairns Group in their 
proposals. 
From  this  perspective,  a  possible  compromise  would  be  to  stick  to  a  30 percent 
reduction, but to set the base period to 1988 if the EC, and other countries, must receive some 
negotiating credit for the adjustments they have made to their domestic farm programs.  As a 
quid pro quo,  the EC could then agree to a commitment to review the agreement in 1994 or 
1995, with the objective of continuing the process of farm policy reform through the end of the 
century. 
Market Access 
Agreement on improving market access may prove somewhat more troublesome, but could still 
be accomplished with some flexibility in the EC's position.  The Hellstrom paper is not explicit 
about tariffication.  The obligation to tariffy non-tariff barriers must be confirmed explicitly in 
the final agreement.  The EC position on market access could be made more acceptable in three 
ways.  First, the EC could turn back to the original Commission proposal to reduce the fixed 
tariffs that would replace its current variable levies by 30 percent (rather than only in parallel 
with domestic prices as the current EC offer suggests),  and to  start from a more recent base 
period (rather than the average of 1986-88 as  suggested in the EC offer).  Second,  the EC, 
should treat fluctuations in exchange rates and in world commodity market prices equally in any 
modifications to  buffer against large world  price changes  (rather than keeping  the reference 
exchange rate completely fixed).  Third, tariff equivalents should be calculated from the prices 
EC producers actually receive rather than from official support prices. 
The EC has indicated that it might accept a minimum access commitment of 3 percent 
of domestic consumption for all agricultural products.  The Hellstrom draft proposed a 5 percent 
minimum access commitment as  had  Canada and the Cairns Group.  Access commitments in 
terms of quantities traded have a number of economic drawbacks as they can lead to new trade 
distortions.  Hence,  to  support the development of a liberal trading  system,  it would be far 
preferable to achieve an overall reduction of access barriers.  However, expanded quantitative 
access  and  the willingness  to  phase-out exports of the  commodities and  products concerned 
would be possible beginning for Canada and others appealing to their use of supply control as 
a means to reduce trade distortions. 
Among the more troublesome aspects of the negotiations on market access has been the 
EC's demand  for  permission  to  "rebalance"  protection  as  a  condition  for  its  agreement  to 
tariffication of the variable levy.  Ideally, rebalancing by increasing protection should have no 
place in a trade agreement designed to reduce it.  If the Community insists on revoking zero 
tariff bindings  it should  do  so  by invoking  Article XXVIII of the  General  Agreement  and 
negotiate an appropriate level of compensation to its trading partners.  If, however, rebalancing 
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of protection is a political imperative for the EC than the negotiations should seize on the EC'  s 
indication that it is  prepared to  limit rebalancing  to  non-grain  feeds.  This  would avoid  the 
increase in protection on oilseeds  and  their products  to  which  the United States,  the Cairns 
Group and many developing nations object.  The present level of market access of the other 
products (com gluten  feed,  citrus pulp and  manioc) could be safeguarded with tariff quotas. 
With the extent and  significance of rebalancing  much  reduced,  the replacement of the EC's 
variable levy  system  with  falling  tariffs  would  be a  major accomplishment of the  Uruguay 
Round. 
Export Competition 
The opposition of the EC  to  any  specific  constraint on  export  subsidies  has  been the  most 
difficult problem facing the negotiators until now.  However, the EC made a significant, though 
tentative,  move in  Brussels by indicating  that it might be prepared to limit the quantities of 
subsidized  exports it puts on the  world  market.  The Hellstrom  proposal  takes  this  up and 
suggests, as one possible alternative, a reduction of subsidized export quantities by 30 percent 
over five years (starting from a 1988-90 average base). 
As in the case of market access commitments, there are compelling economic and policy 
reasons  to  avoid  using  trade  quantities as  a  basis  for  commitments.  Hence,  the possibility 
envisaged in the Hellstrom paper of entering into commitments regarding budgetary outlays on 
export assistance should be preferred.  A significant reduction of such outlays over a five-year 
period  from  1990  levels  would  be a  sensible  complement to  significantly  reducing  internal 
support and access barriers over the same period. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
An agreement along  the lines  suggested  above  would  require all parties  to  make significant 
concessions regarding both their original negotiating positions and, more importantly, regarding 
the reforms of their domestic and trade policies in agriculture that they would have to undertake 
in the years immediately ahead.  But given the process of reconsidering agricultural policies, 
which has taken place over the four years of the Uruguay Round, it should now be possible to 
accept such commitments.  The essentials of an agreement have been identified in this paper. 
Since  the  GATT  meeting,  the  EC  has  continued  to  reconsider  its  position.  The 
Commission has  brought forward  new  proposals  to  reduce policy prices,  to  provide income 
compensation for smaller farmers,  and to  reduce farm output by introducing compulsory set-
asides  and  tightening  existing  supply  controls.  Such  a  significant  reform  of its  domestic 
agricultural policies would improve international trading relations over time, which might be 
enough to convince others that the EC is at last on the road to genuine internal policy reforms. 
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Other countries must also be prepared to show flexibility in the agricultural discussions, 
in particular with respect to their own domestic farm policies.  The United States will need to 
assure the EC that it is prepared to cut trade distorting support for cereals.  Though always "on 
the table," there has been a suspicion abroad that the United States might in the end try to avoid 
cuts in its deficiency payments for grains.  Japan will have to face up to the fact that movement 
toward the ultimate internationalization of its domestic rice sector would contribute enormously 
to  the  satisfactory  conclusion  of the  Round.  In  this  particular  case,  a  quantitative access 
commitment would be the most appropriate modality.  And Canada must show its willingness 
to  be flexible in its  stance on quantitative import restrictions  in  support of domestic  supply 
control programs.  Canada cannot simultaneously obtain improved access for its export products 
while providing permanent protection for its less competitive farm sectors. 
The Brussels talks injected a sense of realism and urgency into the Uruguay Round that 
had been lacking in the preceding months.  The EC can now see that the United States and the 
Cairns Group were serious when they said that without progress in agriculture there could be 
no progress in other areas.  The United States and  the Cairns Group countries,  on the other 
hand,  now  better  appreciate  the  political  difficulties  that  the  EC  faces  in  reforming  its 
agricultural policies.  If  the Brussels  meeting, and the crisis that it provoked, have created a 
better understanding of each others' positions and of possible compromise, it was a productive 
meeting even though an agreement was not reached.  The critical elements of a meaningful, yet 
attainable, agreement have been identified in this paper. 
12 Anoendix Table 1. 
Reduction of 75 % over 10 years in 
support directly linked to the 
production or price of a specific 
commodity. 
Reduction of 30  % in other trade-
distorting support. 
Commitments implemented with a 
commodity-specific AMS. 
.....  . -.........  : ....  .: ..... :-: 
Market Access> 
Convert all non-tariff barriers to 
bound tariffs.  Bind all tariffs 
Reduce all tariffs by 75 % over 10 
years. 
Establish minimum access commit-
ments and expand access by 
75% over 10 years for products 
currently subject to non-tariff 
barriers using a tariff rate quota. 
These quotas to be eliminated in 
10 years. 
•  ••• ·kil)('M·.shb~i~i~··.·· 
Reduce export subsidies on 
primary agricultural products by 
90% over ten years. 
Export subsidies on processed 
products to be phased out over 
six years. 
Negotiate specific commitments on 
export quantities and budget out-
lays. 
Reduction of 75 % over 10 years 
from a  1988 base using an AMS. 
Policies meeting certain criteria 
would be exempt from reductions 
but subject to monitoring. 
All tariffs, including non-tariff 
measures converted to tariff 
equivalents, to be reduced by 
75 % on a trade weighted basis. 
Current market access to 
be maintained through tariff 
quotas which are to be expanded 
at the rate of reductions in tariff 
equivalents. 
Total budget outlays, per unit 
assistance, and exported quanti-
ties to be reduced by at least 
90% from 1987-89 levels. 
Export subsidies can not be intro 
duced were such assistance does 
not exist. 
Reduction of 30  % in support for 
major commodities using an 
aggregate measure of support, 
with credits given for policy 
actions taken since 1986. Specific 
commitments taken for desig-
nated commodities. 
Tariffication of certain border 
measures, with a 30  % reduction 
in a fixed element but with the 
application of a corrective factor. 
Rebalancing: a tariff quota of 6 % 
on cereal substitutes and oilseeds 
and of 12 % on selected other 
feedstuffs. 
Export restitutions to be less than 
the difference between the inter-
nal price of imports and the 
world price, and not to exceed 
the import charge for the com-
modity. 
Enforce the GATT equitable mar-
ket share disciplines. 
Prohibit introduction of new ex-
port subsidies. 
Identify "green" policies which 
would not be subject to support 
reductions and countervail. 
Govt expenditures on other poli-
cies to be reduced by 50 percent 
over 10 years. 
Credit given for effective supply 
management  . 
All existing tariffs reduced, using 
an harmonization formula, by 
about one-third over 10 years. 
Continue to allow quantitative 
import restrictions to support do-
mestic supply control policies. 
Conversion of non-tariff measures 
to tariffs, these to be reduced by 
50 % or to more than 20 % at the 
end of 10 years. 
New subsidies prohibited and 
existing programs phased out 
over 10 years. 
During transition there would be 
an upper limit on subsidies to 
ensure than market share did not 
exceed that of 1986-88. 
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